NETWORK PRIVACY / VISUAL EXPLAINER

One request. Three relays. No single complete view.

What happens between clicking a link in Tor Browser and seeing a page? Follow Alice’s request, unwrap its protective layers, and discover where privacy comes from—and where it can end.

Beginner friendly6 visual chaptersInteractive diagrams

1. What Is Tor?

Tor (The Onion Router) is a privacy network that forwards traffic through relays operated by volunteers. Instead of connecting directly to a website, your client uses a circuit of relays to make linking your network address to your browsing destination more difficult. See What is Tor?.

Onion routing began as research at the US Naval Research Laboratory in the 1990s: could a network carry communications without revealing who was communicating with whom? Tor developed from that work into an open-source project. Read the Tor Project history.

The network

The distributed relays and protocols that carry traffic.

The browser

Tor Browser is a modified Firefox-based browser configured to use Tor, with additional privacy protections. It is the accessible way to browse through the network. See About Tor Browser.

Legitimate uses include everyday privacy, sensitive research, journalism, and accessing information where censorship blocks it. These uses depend on separating the origin of a connection from its destination.

A direct connection

  1. User
  2. ISP
  3. Website
Your Internet service provider carries the connection toward the website. HTTPS can protect its contents, but does not conceal every piece of connection metadata.

A connection through Tor

  1. User
  2. Guard
  3. Middle
  4. Exit
  5. Website
This diagram shows an ordinary Internet website reached through Tor. Your ISP still carries your connection to Tor; it has been omitted here to emphasize the relay circuit. Onion services use a different path, introduced in chapter 6.

2. How Onion Routing Works

Imagine a message inside three nested envelopes. The outer envelope can be opened by the guard, the next by the middle relay, and the innermost by the exit. Each opening reveals just the material needed for the next stage.

In the actual protocol, the client builds a circuit and negotiates separate keys with its relays. Outgoing data carried in relay cells receives layers of encryption. A relay processes its own layer and forwards the remaining protected data. The envelopes below are a teaching analogy, rather than a literal packet format or a description of the key exchange. See the Tor protocol introduction and relay-cell routing specification.

Peel the layers, one relay at a time

Three nested encryption layers: guard, middle and exit, around application data1 · Guard layer2 · Middle layer3 · Exit layerApplication data

At Alice: three Tor layers protect the outgoing data.

Static reading: Alice adds three layers → guard removes one → middle removes one → exit removes the last. If Alice uses HTTPS, the application data remains protected by TLS after the Tor layers are removed.

3. The Three Tor Relays

A typical circuit to an ordinary website has a guard, a middle relay, and an exit. Select a relay below with a mouse, touch, or the keyboard.

  1. Alice
  2. Website
Explore the circuit. Choose a relay; its full description is also available below.
Cyan = guard · purple = middle · amber = exit. Labels carry the same information as color.
Guard Relay — the first hop

The guard receives Alice’s connection and knows her source IP address. It forwards protected data to the middle relay and normally does not know the final site. Guards are kept for a persistent period to reduce exposure to potentially malicious entry relays, rather than being replaced with every page load. See Understanding guard relays.

Middle Relay — the separating hop

The middle links the guard to the exit. It sees its adjacent relays, but normally neither Alice’s IP address nor the final destination. Its role helps separate the circuit’s two ends.

Exit Relay — the connection to the web

The exit opens a connection to the ordinary website. It knows the external destination and accessible connection metadata, but normally not Alice’s real IP address. Unencrypted HTTP data can be read or altered here. With valid HTTPS, TLS protects the application content between Alice’s browser and the website, including against the exit. Routing roles: Tor protocol introduction; content protection: Secure connections in Tor Browser.

4. Concrete Example: Visiting Wikipedia Through Tor

A fictional walkthrough: Alice lives in Paris and wants to read Wikipedia in Tor Browser. We use https://www.wikipedia.org/, an ordinary Internet address. Relay locations and identities are deliberately unspecified; Tor circuits are not selected as a simple geographic itinerary.

  1. Alice opens Tor Browser and connects to Tor.
  2. Her client establishes a circuit using relay information and cryptographic handshakes.
  3. The request enters the guard.
  4. The middle forwards it along the circuit.
  5. The exit processes the final Tor layer.
  6. The exit contacts Wikipedia; Alice’s browser and the site communicate using HTTPS through that connection.
  7. Wikipedia’s reply travels back through the exit, middle, and guard to Alice.

Follow the request and the response

  1. Alice
  2. Guard
  3. Middle
  4. Exit
  5. Wikipedia

Ready: Alice opens Tor Browser. The arrows show the outgoing request; the response follows the reverse path.

A conceptual animation, not a live Tor connection or packet capture. Outgoing and returning traffic use the circuit in opposite directions. Protocol background: Tor protocol introduction.
Who normally sees what in this example?
ActorNormally visible information
Internet service providerA connection to Tor, with timing and volume, unless special concealment mechanisms make it harder to recognize.
Guard relayAlice’s source IP address and its adjacent middle relay.
Middle relayThe adjacent relays on the circuit.
Exit relayThe external destination and accessible metadata; HTTPS content remains encrypted.
WikipediaThe exit relay’s IP address, plus the requests it receives and any information Alice supplies.

5. What Happens When You Use HTTPS?

Tor separates the network origin from the destination. HTTPS protects the application conversation and authenticates the site through a valid TLS connection. These protections work together. Tor Browser includes HTTPS-Only Mode, which favors HTTPS when available. See Secure connections in Tor Browser.

Tor + HTTP

  1. Alice
  2. Guard
  3. Middle
  4. Exit
  5. Website
Tor circuit protection: Alice → exitExit → website: HTTP content exposed
The exit must handle the unencrypted HTTP stream. It can potentially inspect or change page content, submitted forms, and other HTTP data. Tor’s relay encryption does not extend to the ordinary website.

Tor + HTTPS

  1. Alice
  2. Guard
  3. Middle
  4. Exit
  5. Website
Tor circuit protection: Alice → exitHTTPS / TLS protection: browser → website
The exit forwards TLS-protected bytes. With a valid TLS connection, it cannot read the HTTP path, page contents, passwords, or cookies inside that stream. The website decrypts the application data at its TLS endpoint.

HTTPS does not hide all metadata from the exit: the destination IP address, connection timing and volume remain observable; the hostname is often available through connection setup or DNS. It also does not prevent the destination website from reading what you send to it. Never treat a certificate warning as a harmless formality.

6. What Are Onion Services?

An onion service uses a .onion address and is reached inside Tor. Unlike an ordinary website reached through an exit, the service also builds Tor circuits. This can protect its network location as well as the client’s. Modern onion addresses are tied to the service’s cryptographic identity. See What are onion services?.

Meet inside Tor

  1. Tor client
  2. Client circuit
  3. Rendezvous
  1. Rendezvous
  2. Service circuit
  3. Onion service
Client Tor → circuit Tor → rendezvous point ← circuit Tor ← onion service. Each “circuit” represents multiple relays. The repeated rendezvous box represents the same meeting point, not two different relays.

Introduction point

A contact point advertised by the service. The client uses an introduction to tell the service how to join a chosen rendezvous point.

Rendezvous point

The relay where the client and service circuits meet. It carries their traffic without needing to learn both endpoints’ real IP addresses.

The service sets up introduction points and publishes a descriptor that lets a client find them. The client selects a rendezvous relay, then sends an introduction through an introduction point. The service builds its own circuit to the rendezvous. Once connected, application traffic goes through the rendezvous rather than through the introduction point. See How onion services work.

Two ways to reach a website using Tor
PropertyOrdinary websiteOnion service
AddressFor example, wikipedia.orgA .onion address
ConnectionClient circuit → exit → websiteClient and service circuits meet inside Tor
Content protectionUse valid HTTPS to the siteOnion-service encryption and authentication
Service locationPublic Internet infrastructureCan remain concealed from the client

Check Your Understanding

Try answering before opening each explanation.

Does the guard normally know which Wikipedia page Alice reads?

No. It knows Alice’s source IP address and forwards layered traffic to the next relay. It does not normally learn the final website or page.

Can an exit read an HTTPS password?

With a valid TLS connection, the password is protected until it reaches the website. An unencrypted HTTP password would be exposed.

Does an onion service use a normal exit?

No. Client and service circuits meet at a rendezvous point inside Tor.

Further reading: What is Tor?, Understanding guard relays, Secure connections in Tor Browser, and How onion services work. Diagrams and examples are original educational illustrations. Documentation checked on 11 October 2026.